Abstract. In this work key recovery algorithms from the known internal states of RC4 are investigated. In particular, we propose a bit-by-bit approach to recover the key by starting from LSB's of the key bytes and ending with their MSB's.
Introduction
Synchronous stream ciphers are symmetric cryptosystems which are suitable in software applications with high throughput requirements, or in hardware applications with restricted resources (such as limited storage, gate count, or power consumption). RC4 is probably the most popular stream cipher in use. In this work we are going to investigate the key recovery algorithms from the known internal states of RC4. Roos in 1995 [6] noticed that some of the elements of the initial permutations have a bias towards a linear combination of the secret key bytes. A theoretical proof of these biases was given by Paul and Maitra [5] which was later generalized by Biham and Carmeli [2] . In [5,2] the authors also provide algorithms for key reconstruction from the internal state using the derived biases. However the algorithms from [5] have high complexities, low success probabilities and the one from [2] has low complexity, and still low success probability. In addition, the authors of [2] did not analyze the complexity of their algorithm for having a higher success probability. In fact, the newly found generalized biases have not been exploited to the degree they deserve in the key recovery algorithm of [2] . The main idea of our work is to fully exploit the whole distribution of noises expressing these biases. In a hypotheses testing model, we then study how far one can go by using only the distribution of noises. Having carefully analyzed the noise distributions, we then propose a bit-by-bit approach to recover the key bits by starting from LSB's of the key bytes and ending with their MSB's. The nice feature of our algorithm is that we are able to estimate its complexity versus success probability, showing possibility of recovering the key with high success probability but reasonable time complexity. 
Description of RC4 and Notations
. 8: until enought outputs have been produced.
The goal of the attacker is to determine the secret key out of a known segment of keystream. This can be done in two steps: first to determine a state out from the keystream segment, and in a second step to determine the key out of the internal state. Note that the initial state S N can be easily computed given any intermediate internal state at any time during the PRGA. In this paper we only deal with the second step, i.e. recovering the secret key k from a given initial state S N (or equivalently from array C). The interested reader is referred to [4] for the best known attack on the first step, i.e. recovering the internal state from the known keystream segment. Another type of attack on RC4 is key recovery attack when the secret key contains a known initialization vector part and the attacker has access to the keystreams of many (chosen) initialization vectors for the same unknown key part, see [8] for a recent attack.
Previous Results
Roos in 1995 [6] noticed that some of the elements of the initial permutations have a bias towards a linear combination of the secret key bytes. A theoretical proof of these biases was given by Paul and Maitra [5] , later generalized by Biham and Carmeli [2] . Thanks to our choice C[−1] = 0, these results can be given in a unified theorem as follows.
